Ashiabi, M.A. Eric Elikem

The concept of electoral reforms is a paradox – supposed to increase fairness in elections but can be misused to achieve the opposite. Though electoral reforms connote legal changes to electoral laws that serve as basis for future elections in the process of democratization, electoral reforms could also afford autocrats the opportunity to tighten their grip on political power in the process of autocratization. Especially in developing countries, electoral reforms are seen as a means of defeating opposition parties even before the elections are held.

My research seeks to ascertain the veracity of the claim that opposition parties are the losers of electoral reforms in Africa by answering the question “how often and after what kind of reforms have opposition parties lost post-electoral-reform elections in Africa since 1990?” and “what motives underpin opposition party elites’ participation in post-electoral reform elections?” To answer the first question, I draw on a panel data analysis of electoral reforms after the transition elections in African countries.

To answer the second question, I conduct a small-N qualitative comparison using data from elite interviews of opposition parties in two-party and pluralised party systems that participated in post-electoral reform elections. Based on the existing literature, my initial hypotheses are that opposition party leaders participate in post-electoral reform elections (i) to be in position to benefit from reformers’ miscalculations, (ii) to please their support base, (iii) to be able to also reform the electoral system should they win and/or (iv) because they identify with reformers’ values.